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League of Nations

Japan's case in the Sino-Japanese dispute



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# JAPAN'S CASE

## IN THE SINO-JAPANESE DISPUTE

AS PRESENTED BEFORE THE SPECIAL  
SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY OF THE  
LEAGUE OF NATIONS

JAPANESE DELEGATION  
TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

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GENEVA, 1933



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## CONTENTS

	PAGE
Foreword .....	5
I. Address Delivered at the Ninth Plenary Meeting, December 6, 1932 .....	9
II. Extemporaneous Address Delivered at the Four- teenth Plenary Meeting, December 8, 1932 ...	25
III. Observations of the Japanese Delegation on the Draft Report Submitted to the Assembly by the Committee of Nineteen, February 21, 1933	42
IV. Address Delivered by Yosuke Matsuoka, Chief Japanese Delegate, at the Seventeenth Ple- nary Meeting of the Special Assembly of the League of Nations, February 24, 1933 .....	49
V. Declaration of the Japanese Government Follow- ing the Vote of the Assembly on the Report Submitted by the Committee of Nineteen, February 24, 1933 .....	62
VI. Farewell Message Given Out by Yosuke Matsuoka on the Eve of his Departure from Geneva, February 25, 1933 .....	63

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## FOREWORD

Do you want chaos to continue in China, endangering international relations, with the eventual possibility of another great war?

That is the general burden of the first two addresses, which I delivered before the Assembly of the League of Nations. Japan wants no war. She seeks to prevent the development of war. Her actions in Manchuria have been taken with this object in view, and therefore in conformity with the purposes of the League of Nations. It is because there is in Europe and America so little understanding of Japan and China, and their relations with Russia, that the Western World has permitted itself to be misled with regard to the policies of my country. These policies, the disordered condition of China, and the potentialities with regard to the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, I have endeavoured to explain.

In the address which I delivered extemporaneously before the Assembly on December 8th, 1932, there may appear to be contradictions in my references to Soviet Russia. These are not contradictions but a logical conflict that arises from a contradiction of the facts themselves. One fact is that we want no trouble with the U.S.S.R.; the other is that we want no extension of Communistic control in China. With regard to the U.S.S.R. there are two trends of thought in Japan at the present moment. One is that that country is a menace to Japan, because of efforts to spread Sovietism over the Far East and because of the military development within the Soviet Union. Those Japanese who are anxious over this combined development and propaganda think that our country should strike at the U.S.S.R. before the

potential menace fully materializes. The other opinion is that the issues conflicting between the two countries can be peacefully settled by means of diplomacy. The writer shares this latter view.

In the same address of December 8, I referred to Japan being misunderstood at the present time and called attention to the fact that Jesus of Nazareth, also misunderstood, was crucified in His time. As I have said, I was speaking extemporaneously, and I failed to phrase the remark as well as might have been done. But, of course, I had no intention of comparing Japan with Jesus. I meant only to give a striking example of error in contemporaneous judgment. Japan believes she is doing what is right under the circumstances and conditions existing at present in the Far East and believes that time will vindicate her actions.

The observations of the Japanese Delegation, dated February 21 and circulated among the Members of the Special Session of the League, and the last speech of mine before the General Assembly on February 24 represent the earnest and last efforts by Japan to warn the Members against taking precipitate action, without having an opportunity of fully and intimately acquainting themselves with all the facts of the case. Such action can solve nothing, and would only add one more difficulty to a situation already complicated and confused enough as it is.

My Farewell Message was dictated to my secretary on the train that carried us away from Geneva to Paris on the afternoon of February 25, a day which I shall never be able to blot out of my memory as long as I live. It fairly expresses the emotion and thoughts that surged up in me as I waved my hat to a multitude of friends, both Japanese and foreigners, who had come to the station to bid me godspeed, and as I watched through the windows the beautiful hills and sparkling rivulets of Switzerland fleeting past us as our train sped on. Sad but not disappointed, calm but determined, I surveyed mentally what

had happened at the League in the past three months and tried to look into the future to discern the meaning of all that—with an humble prayer at heart that all may yet turn out well for all—for humanity.

For the purpose of improving or elucidating the phraseology, I have made some slight corrections in the addresses as originally delivered. Where statements or their phraseology were found to be inaccurately rendered in the Minutes, due rectifications have also been made.

YOSUKE MATSUOKA.

*New York City, March, 1933.*



# I

## ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE NINTH PLENARY MEETING

December 6th, 1932

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—Almost all, if not quite all, of the points made by the Chinese Delegate have been answered and completely refuted in advance. I do not, therefore, think it necessary at this moment to enter into a discussion with him. I reserve the right to make further observations, if I deem it advisable, later. Also, I do not really feel it necessary for me to detain you long by making a speech, but there are some points upon which Japan wishes particularly to lay stress and to bring out more clearly and forcibly. Therefore, I trust you will permit me to claim the indulgence of this body.

The Japanese point of view has already been stated in our Observations, in my addresses before the Council and in communications to it. But the issue is of such a serious character that we want to spare no effort to bring the Members of the Assembly to a realisation of the facts.

There seems to be an impression that Japan opposes, and China supports, the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. No such generalisation is warranted. There is much in the Report that the Chinese can accept with no pleasure. The document has brought a strong light to bear upon the conditions prevailing in China which representatives of her Government throughout the world have long sought to cover, to excuse and to condone. There are many parts and passages in the Report which we regard as entirely correct and accurate. Our principal disagreement with the Report, in the sections dealing with the disordered



condition of China, is where it occasionally expresses optimism for the rehabilitation of the country. We, too, have hope, but it is not for the immediate future, for a country in China's condition of disorganisation, as Chinese history shows, cannot recover quickly. For a country vaster than Europe in territory and larger than Europe in population to change abruptly from an ancient to a modern State is too much to expect in a brief period of time.

Japan is a loyal supporter of the League of Nations. In conformity with the principles of peace, on which the League is founded, we have striven to avoid war for many years under provocations that, prior to the drafting of the Covenant, would certainly have brought it about. Our adherence to the Covenant has been a guiding principle in our foreign policy for the thirteen years of the League's existence, and we have been proud to participate in the advancement of its noble project. No open-minded person who has observed our long and earnest patience in our relations with China can contend to the contrary.

Our Government was still persisting earnestly in efforts to induce the Chinese Government at Nanking and that of Chang Hsueh-liang at Mukden, to see the light of reason when the incident of September 18th, 1931, took place. We wanted no such situation as has developed. We sought in Manchuria only the observance of our treaty rights and the safety of the lives of our people and their property. We wanted from China the right to trade, according to existing treaties, free from unwarranted interference and molestation. But our policy of patience and our efforts at persuasion were misinterpreted by the Chinese people. Our attitude was regarded as weakness, and provocations became persistently more unbearable.

A Government which had its beginning as a result of aid obtained from Soviet Russia, in arms, men and money (seven or eight years ago) and which is still imbued with what are called "revolutionary" principles, was not content to injure our trad-



ing interests in China proper, but extended its campaign against us into Manchuria with the avowed purpose of driving us out of that territory—territory which we, through war with Russia, had returned to the Manchu Dynasty twenty-seven years ago. That our rights and interests were assailed, and even, in some cases, the persons of Japanese subjects attacked, are facts established by record. That we acted in self-defence is clear and warranted.

When the United Kingdom Government sent troops and naval vessels to Shanghai, in 1927, it had foreknowledge of the menace threatening that city. The United Kingdom Government was, therefore, in a position to inform the League of its intentions. Our Government was in no such position with regard to Manchuria, because it did not expect the incident of September 18th, 1931, to take place. Our Government had no knowledge of the trouble until after it occurred. But, on learning of it, we informed the League. It must be well noted, in this connection, that, prior to the incident, we had been making every effort to negotiate and bring about better understanding and feelings in Manchuria, and had not been abandoned until the last moment the hope that our efforts would be crowned with success. Our Government also hoped subsequently to check the developments and limit their scope in the affected territory, but too many elements were active in opposition. Chinese military forces were mobilised at Chinchow and rebel armies, remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's forces, assembled in other parts of the country.

Later, in October, 1931, Japan proposed to enter into direct negotiations with China, with a view to arriving at a pacific settlement of the controversy. Our Government was insistent on this point. But the Council of the League failed to countenance it, and China, encouraged by the attitude taken by the League, turned a deaf ear to this proposal, thus stiffening and complicating the situation. What followed is well known. At the same time, the boycott—which had been going on in China

before the incident—was greatly intensified, thereby provoking, on the one hand, further ill-feelings in Japan and, on the other hand, adding fuel to the mob psychology in China.

The Chinese Representative spoke before the Council the other day of the legalisation of the boycott. If that is admitted, it is sure to create a very serious situation. In point of fact, the statement he made in that sense provoked a fresh outbreak of the boycott in many parts of China (as related at length in the communication made by our delegation yesterday to the League). The boycott, as we see it in China, is a great hindrance to the promotion of international peace and co-operation. It creates circumstances which threaten the good understanding between nations, on which peace depends. It therefore deserves a thorough consideration on the part of the League, one of whose primary duties lies in the elimination of possible causes of friction between nations.

While the situation was developing in Manchuria, efforts were made in Europe and America to rally what is called “world opinion” against Japan. The craft of propaganda, in which our Chinese friends are particularly adept, was put into effective use in shaping world opinion against Japan before the facts were fully known.

The success of this last activity in Western countries had unfortunate effects in the East. It encouraged Chinese leaders to take an uncompromising attitude towards us. It encouraged them to believe that Western countries would interfere and save them from the consequence of their anti-foreign policies as they were applied to Japan and her interests. It accentuated a situation from which we were unable to withdraw without danger of further and more serious evils to follow.

In dealing with China, Japan is dealing with a State in a menacing condition. The actual menace to us not only existed prior to the incident of September 18th, 1931, but was being intensified by the activities of the Kuomintang Party and officials

of the Nanking Government. As far as there is a National Government in China, that Government is related closely to the Kuomintang. The Report of the Commission of Enquiry is emphatic on this point. It states on page 16 that, "in 1927, the Central Government was established at Nanking. It was controlled by the party (Kuomintang Party)—it was, in fact, merely one important organ of the party." Against such a party and Government, and against their declared policy and active efforts to terminate our interests and treaties in Manchuria, we have acted in defence. We have acted also with a view to promoting and preserving peace. Because our action came as the result of an incident does not alter the general fact. It had to come sooner or later. The menace to Japan was actual. If her rights and interests in Manchuria were violated, the sufferer would be none but Japan.

The question is asked why the Japanese Government did not seek protection from the League. The answer is that, in view of the present structure and scope of the League, effective protection could not be expected from that body promptly. In the situation that existed in Manchuria, Japan had to deal first with imminent danger; secondly, with a country whose authority did not extend to Manchuria; and, thirdly, with a Government which had adopted a policy of unilateral abrogation of treaties and conventions. In so exceptional a situation, was it possible to expect protection from the League? As to the other reasons, I had occasion to mention them before the Council.

If it is contended that the League could have afforded Japan adequate protection, why was it—may I be permitted to ask—that the League Council gave its approval, with no dissenting voice, when the United Kingdom, with France, the United States and Japan, sent troops to Shanghai in 1927? Not only did the League refrain from protesting on that occasion, the Government of China also refrained. At that time, Dr. Wellington Koo was the Prime Minister of the Government at Peking. The Govern-



ment then welcomed the presence of the British and other troops at Shanghai as of possible service to them in staying the advance of the Nationalist forces then hostile to them. The same Peking Government also refrained, for the same reason, from calling the attention of the League to the despatch of Japanese troops to Tsinanfu in 1927 and 1928, for then the Japanese might have been of help in saving them from defeat. The Chinese Representative, in a statement made before the Council the other day, claimed that Japanese troops were sent to Tsinanfu with the object of interfering with the advance of what he called the "ever-victorious" Nationalist army and of preventing the unification of China. Dr. Koo must know very well that our real object in despatching troops to the capital of Shantung was to protect the lives and property of our people.

He must also know that the "Old Marshal" gave vent, at the time, to a display of anger that our troops refrained from assisting him, as they could have done. They could have saved the "Old Marshal's" position in North China and incidentally that of Dr. Koo. But they followed the traditional Japanese policy of refraining from interference in the civil wars of China. Now, however, Dr. Koo comes to Geneva as a representative of the Government which defeated his chief of four years ago and reverses his position.

At the time when the United Kingdom sent troops to Shanghai, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the British Foreign Secretary, sent a letter (dated February 8th, 1927) to the League of Nations, from which I beg leave to quote. On the subject of the condition of China, the letter says:

"Unfortunately, since 1922 (the date of the Nine-Power Treaty), China has become more disunited than ever . . . That Canton Nationalist Government has now increased its authority over the greater part of the country south of the Yangtze River, and claims to be recognised as the only Government of

all China. This fact has modified the hypothesis upon which the Washington policy was based."

On the subject of the boycott, Sir Austen's letter to the League states:

"The extremists of the Canton Nationalist party have singled out the British people for an implacable campaign of calumny and boycott. Indeed, enmity against Britain has been deliberately and persistently cultivated by this section and its advisers, in order to promote the solidarity of the Nationalist Party and stimulate its aggressive spirit . . .

"The extremely friendly and considerate attitude of His Majesty's Government, as shown at the Washington Conference and on many other occasions, was contemptuously brushed aside."

Will any one who knows the terms of the treaties regarding China, signed at the Washington Conference, dispute the fact that the greatest concessions made by any Power to China at that time were those that Japan made? Greater than the concessions of all other nations combined were those which Japan made to China.

With regard to anti-British propaganda, Sir Austen's letter to the League reads:

"... it is essential that the official stimulation of the anti-British propaganda must cease. The comparative peace of the greater part of Southern China during the last two or three months has proved that, when organised agitation and intimidation are absent, friendly relations between the Chinese and British people remain as excellent as they have been in the past."

Those are the words of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

The same thing can also be said of relations between the Chinese and Japanese people.

In regard to a settlement by the League of the difficulties which existed between the United Kingdom and China five years ago, Sir Austen said in conclusion that:

“His Majesty’s Government deeply regret that there does not appear to be any way in which the assistance of the League in the settlement of the difficulties in China can be sought at present.”

Japan, likewise, saw no way in which the League could help her in Manchuria. Moreover, let it be noted the marked difference between the case of Shanghai and that of Manchuria. Whereas the United Kingdom sent troops to Shanghai, Japanese troops were already on the spot by virtue of treaty rights, for the protection of the Japanese interests along the South Manchuria Railway.

It was the plan of the Nationalist Government (in which the present National Government had its beginning) to concentrate its propaganda and hostility upon one foreign Government, its interests and its people in China, at a time. In 1926 and 1927, the hostility against Japan was deliberately abated under orders from the Government, and concentrated upon the British. They were then the “capitalists and imperialists” to be got rid of first. The British Concessions in China Treaty Ports were pointed out to the masses of ignorant and hungry people and to the undisciplined and rapacious soldiery as places of wealth which they were encouraged to recover. Much of the country was placarded with pictures depicting John Bull as an ogre who had garnered his wealth by exploiting Chinese labour and robbing the Chinese people. It was as a result of such incitements that the British Concessions at Hankow and Kiukiang were surrendered to the Nationalists. But there the British tolerance came to an end. When General Chiang Kaishek arrived with his army at Shanghai, he found that that city was not to be a prize for his army. It was surrounded by an adequate defence force of British,



French and other troops, who were prepared in redoubts, behind barbed wire entanglements, to hold it against him. On surveying the lines, it was evident to the Chinese Commander-in-Chief what would happen to his troops if he attempted the assault. Needing his soldiers for fighting other Chinese generals, he wisely and quickly came to terms with the British officials.

Since that time the concentration of hostility has been made against Japan, accompanied by efforts abroad to spread dislike and distrust of us by adroit and insidious diplomacy and by propaganda. Sooner or later the results could not be otherwise than what has occurred. What has taken place the Assembly knows.

At the root of the present trouble between Japan and China we find the lack of cohesion between realities in China and the aspirations of the modern Chinese. In order to satisfy these aspirations, progress is needed. Progress in China, is, in our opinion, essential, not only to the maintenance of law and order, but to a stabilisation of her foreign relations. It should, therefore, be the urgent duty of the League to aid China in this direction. The fundamental principle of the League is to promote international co-operation and achieve international peace and security, as pointed out in the Preamble of the Covenant. Japan, for her part, is ready to do all in her power to co-operate with the League in helping China to attain progress.

With regard to the independence of Manchoukuo, the Japanese Government cannot be held responsible. Even the Report of the Commission of Enquiry nowhere impeaches the Japanese Government in this connection. It is one thing to state that some officials or officers interested themselves in the autonomy movement (the Commission perhaps meant to refer to the attempt to recover peace and order through local government, although the phraseology is not clear). It is another thing to hold a Government responsible for abetting an independence movement. Prior to September 18th, and even thereafter, our Govern-

ment had no plan or design to accomplish the independence of Manchuria, nor has it allowed itself at any time to be connected with the independence movement.

First came the movement of the leaders of the people in the territory itself. This, contrary to the Commission's Report, was definite and emphatic, and began within eight days after the incident of September 18th. Before our troops in Manchuria had time to consider anything beyond their immediate military duties, before our Government had time to learn the full significance of the events that were taking place, the movement was being launched by Chinese leaders in Manchuria. Learning of this movement, our Government took immediate steps to avoid participation, reaffirming its traditional policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of China. On September 26th, both Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, and General Minami, the War Minister, issued instructions, respectively, to the civil and military representatives of Japan in Manchuria, forbidding participation in this movement.

But their efforts could not stop the movement on the part of the leaders of the people in Manchuria, nor could it stop the sympathy of Japanese with them. The people of Manchuria had suffered too long under the oppression of ruthless dictators; and, seeing the opportunity to organise a civil Government, they lost no time in taking advantage of it.

We have given an outline of the progress of this movement in our Observations on the Commission's Report, and the Manchoukuo Government furnished the Commission with a detailed history of the movement on the occasion of its visit to Manchuria. I shall not, therefore, take up more of your time by narrating the story. I only wish to refer you to these documents, which I feel confident will give you a right picture of the movement.

With regard to the recognition of Manchoukuo there is this to say. The new government had the sympathy of all Japanese people. We saw in it the solution of a problem which had

troubled us for forty years. We saw in it the termination of hostile incitement from China Proper. We saw the advent of a civil Government, composed of reasonable men who understood the strategic and economic importance of the territory to Japan. We saw the promise of peace for the future. We wanted peace. We did not, and we do not, want Manchuria. We wanted only the preservation of our rights and interests there. Here, at hand, was the solution, the prompt recognition of Manchoukuo; and our Government, in giving that recognition, acted in response to the demands of the Japanese people and the appeals of Manchoukuo. If all the conditions in the Far East were fully known and carefully weighed, it would become evident that Japan, so vitally interested in Manchuria, could not possibly withhold the recognition any longer. In point of fact, the extension of recognition to one State by another is entirely within the exercise of its sovereignty and can in no case be contested by another. There are many precedents in European and American history. I would add that the effect of the recognition of Manchoukuo by Japan cannot fail to be wholesome throughout the entire Far East. It should be known that the whole nation of Japan regards Manchuria as a key to the solution of all Far Eastern questions.

The Commission's Report says (on page 125) that:

"The all-important problem at the present time is the establishment of an administration acceptable to the population and capable of supplying the last need—namely, the maintenance of law and order."

The Report states also (on page 132) that:

"It would be the function of the Council, in the paramount interest of world peace, whatever may be the eventuality, to decide how the suggestions made in our report may be extended and applied to events which are still developing from day to day, always with the object of securing a durable



understanding between China and Japan, by utilising all the sound forces, whether in ideals or persons, whether in thought or action, which are at present fermenting in Manchuria."

It is stated in Chapter IX of the Report (page 127) that:

"A mere restoration of the *status quo ante* would be no solution. Since the present conflict arose out of the conditions prevailing before last September, to restore these conditions would be to invite a repetition of the trouble. It would be to treat the whole question theoretically and to leave out of account the realities of the situation."

And in another place (on page 130) the Report says that "a satisfactory regime for the future might be evolved out of the present one without any violent change."

In the light of these findings of the Commission of Enquiry, I should like to know what the Assembly will think of the actions already taken, and of those that are being taken, in Manchoukuo by Chang-Hsueh-liang and by the Nanking Government. But it is my opinion that these actions run counter to these findings by the Commission. We would therefore suggest that the sound forces, of which the Report speaks, be left to develop naturally. Interference with their development might bring about consequences contrary to what the League has been seeking to accomplish.

We Japanese, knowing China, do not take seriously the warnings often made at Geneva—that China will be unified and militarised as a result of Japan's action in Manchuria. We believe that a really united China is a peaceful China, not a militarised China. I am afraid advantage is taken by the Chinese Representatives of Western unfamiliarity with Eastern psychology. There are more armed soldiers in China even to-day than in any other country in the world. There are between two and three million men in arms. But the hostility of any of the military chiefs to

foreigners is not as great as their hostility to one another. This has always been the case, from the days of the first British wars with the Chinese. Chinese generals do not always support one another against a foreign enemy. In short, Chinese armies are not created primarily for the national defence of the country.

Since the proclamation of the Republic in China, Governments have been short-lived. They have risen and fallen in quick succession. And now what do we see? A National Government that had its beginning in the Russian movement to "sovietise" China; a Government that controls only the several provinces about the mouth of the Yangtze River, and even these not completely; a Government that rebelled from the Soviet movement, but retained its revolutionary principles regarding the unilateral abrogation of treaties with foreign countries. The League Commission's Report states at the top of page 23 that "Communism has become an actual rival of the National Government." The communist movement controls as many provinces as the recognised Government. I might even say that communism is to-day eating into the very heart of China. In this connection, we would say that Japan cannot afford to shut her eyes to the possibilities of the future.

Our action in recognising the State of Manchoukuo was the only and the surest way for us to take in the present circumstances. In the absence of any other means of stabilising conditions in that territory—where we have interests, both strategic and economic, which we cannot sacrifice—we had no other recourse.

Now the Assembly has to consider whether it will or will not make suggestions for a settlement, and, should it decide to make them, what those suggestions will be. Any suggestions should, we think, be governed by the following principles:

(1) The terms must be such that they can be effectively put into operation, and that they will accomplish and preserve peace in the Far East. .

(2) A solution must be found for the disordered condition of China.

(3) In case any plan for settlement is found by the League, this organisation must take upon itself the responsibilities for its execution.

Considering the actual condition in China, the execution is one that is likely to be costly, and the League should have both the will and the means to make the necessary sacrifices. Is any Member of the League ready to participate with others in such an undertaking?

Japan is fully conscious of the fact that the League is a bulwark of peace. The spirit of the League coincides with the fundamental policy of Japan, which is to consolidate peace in the Far East and to contribute to the maintenance of peace throughout the world. This she believes to be her share in contributing towards the progress of the world and the promotion of human welfare.

It is true that voices have been raised in some quarters criticising the efficiency of the League. But the fact that the Manchurian affair has not led to open war between China and Japan, or to trouble between other interested Powers, is assuredly due to actions of the League. It may be safely said that the League has thus fulfilled the high object of its existence. To hope for anything over and beyond what it has done in this direction would be to expect too much, under present conditions in China.

Again, as to the apprehension entertained in some quarters that the present case might lead to weakening, or even undermining the principles of the Covenant, we firmly believe that such apprehension is entirely groundless. The exceptional nature of the present case makes it plain that you can hardly apply to it those principles by generalisation. Nor do the Japanese actions militate against the Pact of Paris, or against any other treaties.



The Report of the Commission brings out this exceptional nature clearly when it states, on page 38, that:

“This summary of the long list of Japan’s rights in Manchuria shows clearly the exceptional character of the political, economic and legal relations created between that country and China in Manchuria. There is probably nowhere in the world an exact parallel to this situation, no example of a country enjoying in the territory of a neighbouring State such extensive economic and administrative privileges.”

All the world is in a constant state of change. All objects, animate and inanimate, are constantly moving, let us hope, towards a better state. Might not the League well take cognisance of the ever-changing conditions in the East and judiciously adjust its views and actions to them? As we Japanese read the Covenant, it is not a hard, implacable instrument.

In conclusion, I would say that, as for Japan and China in particular, we look for the time to come when these two nations of the distant East will realise the common origin of their culture and traditions and the common interests of their existence, and will co-operate with a sense of mutual understanding and respect, in the policy of upholding peace in the Far East, thereby serving the cause of world peace, in and with the League of Nations.

Allow me only to add a few words in reference to what is called the Fushun incident.\* We have already filed with the

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\* Dr. W. W. Yen, the Chinese Delegate, had earlier in the session read the following telegram, which, he said, he had received from the Chinese Legation in Washington:

“Edward Hunter, a correspondent of the International News Service belonging to Mr. William Hearst, has made an investigation on the spot of the massacre and reports what follows:

‘What I saw with my own eyes and heard from refugees and inhabitants leaves no possibility of doubt that unbelievable massacre occurred. Three villages burnt, nothing left alive. Villagers at bayonet point were herded like cattle and slaughtered. Houses were soaked with kerosene and burnt. Japanese admit that the attackers of Fushun were not natives of villages, who were suspected of giving the volunteers food and lodging. Hunter saw scattered shreds of bloodstained clothes of peasants, and crude burial of remains of killed under fresh sod.’

Council the information obtained by us upon enquiry addressed to our Government, and I presume you have that information by this time. Nevertheless, let me point out that our Chinese friends have a habit of exaggerating and thereby misrepresenting. We are ready to stand by and prove that the facts as given by our delegation are true.

As to Mr. Hunter's information, to which the Chinese Delegation has attached so much importance, allow me to give you some information about this representative at Mukden of the International News Service. This correspondent went to Fushun, on the South Manchuria Railway, on November 30th, and only met one missionary, from whom he heard the story. He immediately went to Shanhai-Kwan, a long way from Mukden, and sent his despatches abroad. The foreign correspondents at Mukden were very angry at his action and despatched their telegrams contradicting and correcting the telegram sent by Mr. Hunter.

If any delegate is particularly interested in this affair, I would suggest that he should read these news items in the newspapers. I shall not take up your time now by reading the telegrams and press reports.

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"Japanese Embassy denies Hunter's account, but admits killing 350 alleged bandits and unspecified number of unruly associates.

"In a second telegram Hunter reports that he visited eight villages completely destroyed along three routes to Fushun and suspected of lodging the volunteers. A survivor relates that he escaped because he was mistaken for killed. With 100 others they fled to hillside after watching homes burned. They were gathered together to be photographed, but instead of that they were machine-gunned. Later someone whispered, 'Japanese gone,' but those who rose from the ground were again machine-gunned. Later the Japanese bayoneted survivors, including children."

## II

### EXTEMPORANEOUS ADDRESS DELIVERED AT THE FOURTEENTH PLENARY MEETING

December 8th, 1932

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—Since the day before yesterday, I have been listening with very keen interest to the addresses which have been made. On the speeches themselves I reserve the right to make whatever comment I may deem necessary at a later stage, and I shall not enter into a discussion on them at the moment. However, I would like to point out a feature which I might characterise as altogether unfair in the speeches of many of my Colleagues. That feature is the cutting out and breaking off of parts of the Report of the Commission of Enquiry and the taking of small portions of my addresses and the Observations of my Government, without any reference to the context. Such quotations were often made the basis of criticism and attacks against me or against my country, or were used to produce conclusions altogether unwarranted, if one were to take pains to read the whole of the context. That, I consider, is altogether unfair and I do not think that any of you will disagree with me.

As an example, I cannot understand why many of the speakers referred to a passage in the Report of the Commission where it is stated, with reference to the action of Japanese troops on the night of September 18th, that:

“The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night, which have been described above, cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence.”



That is the passage as quoted by my Colleagues, but it leaves out the remainder of the paragraph, which, so far as I can recall, only one or two speakers read. The rest of the paragraph reads as follows :

“In saying this, the Commission does not exclude the hypothesis that the officers on the spot may have thought they were acting in self-defence.”

If I am correctly informed, I have heard that the Commissioners had pretty hot discussions on these two passages. I heard that some of the Commissioners could not agree to accept the first unless it were qualified by the second. If you wish to prove what I have heard, I would propose to the Assembly that the Commissioners should be called in. This is one instance in which I feel a misrepresentation has been made.

Again, to show you how some of my statements were misrepresented, let me refer you to a passage in the speech of our learned Colleague from Greece, who is well known and respected in my country. I have yet to go through the records; so I may be wrong, but I did understand him to say, in reference to the question of self-defence, that Japan has got to prove that she is not guilty of the charge—the conclusion as found in the Report of the Commission. That is to say, you bring a charge and then tell the defendant to prove that he is not guilty. I do not think such a rule of burden of proof exists in any country. Certainly it does not exist in my country, and I cannot bring myself to believe that such a rule of *onus probandi* prevails even in the League of Nations.

I think these two examples suffice to show what I mean in referring to a feature that I may characterise as altogether unfair.

I particularly make a reservation with regard to the address of our Chinese Colleague to-day. I will not now go into the details of that speech, but I trust you will permit me to refer to one or two points. He was anxious to show in what a bad

condition Japan was economically and financially. I am not prepared to make any protest to that charge; to a certain extent, I admit it. Japan also belongs to that group of Powers which are suffering from the world depression, and I envy China, which our Chinese Colleague claims to be on a higher plane of finance and economics—perhaps the only exception in the world to-day. I congratulate him.

Then our Chinese Colleague referred to military caste—I do not remember whether it was Dr. Yen or Dr. Koo who referred to that, either in the Assembly, or in the Council, or even outside the Council. Anyhow, whichever it was, he tried to make out that there were military clans and that Japan is to-day under the thumb of those military clans. Let me simply say that there are no military clans to-day in Japan, neither is there a military caste. I do admit that there are Japanese who are clad in khaki carrying sabres, but I find men in all countries somewhat similarly dressed. They do not come from any particular class and they do not come from any particular caste. For instance General Tanaka, to whose alleged memorial the Chinese Delegate has referred so often, comes from one of the poorest families of Japan. Father and sons were only able to make a living by manufacturing Japanese parasols, and that General Tanaka, whom we regard with respect and love in Japan as one of our great statesmen, carried some of the parasols his father made to other villages to sell. I can give you a great number of cases where noted generals and admirals in Japan also come from very poor families. We have no caste in Japan to-day that particularly produces navy and army officers. When our Chinese Colleague was referring to General Araki as the ruler of Japan, I think he was forgetting that there was an Emperor in Japan whom we regard as our ruler both in name and in reality, and then there are the Prime Minister and other Ministers of State. General Araki is only War Minister.

I think most, if not all, of the points raised by various speak-

ers, including the Chinese Delegate, were answered in advance, and I should like to ask you carefully to study our Observations as well as our statements.

Let me now refer cursorily to the British action in 1927. The Chinese Delegate drew our attention to the difference between the British action then and our actions in Shanghai last spring, or in Manchuria since last autumn. The only difference I can see is that the United Kingdom sent her troops out to China, while, as I pointed out the other day, we had marines in Shanghai, and later we sent land forces. As regards Manchuria, as I also pointed out the other day, our troops were there in virtue of a treaty to safeguard the lives and property of Japanese subjects; there were, and are to-day, over one million Japanese subjects in Manchuria, including Japanese of Korean origin. The United States sent troops to Nicaragua to protect the lives and property of their citizens. I think about seven thousand troops were sent to protect six or seven hundred Americans. Had we adopted that standard, we should have had to send troops to the number, say, of over ten million, and we have not that number in Japan.

Perhaps I can better illustrate what I have in mind by telling the following story: I look upon our dispute in this way—and particularly with reference to the British action in 1927. Britishers had a treaty right to be in China and, finding they were in danger, the British Government sent out troops to lick the spoilt boy of the Far East, if need be. As I pointed out the other day, Chiang Kai-shek quickly came to terms and therefore the Britishers were not obliged to fight. But in our case, in connection with Manchuria, our troops were there. It is as if we were invited into the house of our neighbour, who began to abuse and even to attack us by every imaginable means. We persevered, and, although we Japanese have a lot of patience—more than the average Westerner — we at last got mad and hit the neighbour, and straightaway our neighbour comes to Geneva and says the Japanese invaded his house and struck him down for no cause.



Is it the duty of the League of Nations to protect one from the consequences of one's own folly and actions, inimical, not only to the interests of one's neighbour, but also to the peace of the world?

Our distinguished Colleague from the United Kingdom very aptly said yesterday that none of us can accept the Report of the Commission of Enquiry *in toto*. I do not quote his words, but refer to the sense of them. May I be allowed to undertake to improve his statement just a bit? In the Report of the Commission we do find in a certain sense the unanimity which some speakers have stressed so much; but it is *unanimity in disagreement*. Or, I may put it another way, and say *disagreements in unanimity*. If an impartial reader will take the trouble to compare the Report passage by passage, he will find in it, as we have had occasion to point out time and again, passages which are contradictory. I am not criticising the members of the Commission at all. On the contrary, I pay a very high tribute to their integrity and to the painstaking work so conscientiously carried out by them. Nevertheless, with five members, it is perfectly natural that we should find disagreement in a report such as this. If we did not, it would be a marvel. The very fact that there is *unanimity in disagreement*, or *disagreements in unanimity*, proves that these gentlemen were conscientious and sincere. Contradictions and disagreements are there, nevertheless. While I agree with the distinguished Representative of the United Kingdom, I must add that the very nature of the Report makes it impossible for any one of us to accept it *in toto*.

With regard to the point so often put forward by some Delegates that Japan has violated the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact of Paris, the Nine-Power Treaty, and so forth, it suffices for me again to declare that Japan contends and believes that she is not guilty of such violation.

We Japanese do appreciate and understand the apprehension entertained by some of the so-called small Powers, and we

take the stand that our actions in Manchuria do not warrant such apprehension. On this point, however, I shall refrain from dilating.

On the whole, I am in accord with the principles advocated by different speakers, particularly by those representing what we call small nations. The only difference of opinion, if there is any, is that we do not believe our actions have militated against these principles.

Sir John Simon, M. Paul-Boncour and others pointed out the complexity of the question and pleaded for realities to be taken into consideration. I think we cannot stress that point too much. Again, our Colleague from Italy called attention to the elasticity and flexibility that should be borne in mind in applying the Covenant, and I perfectly agree with him. I even believe that, if we do not bear in mind this particular point, the consequences which any decision taken in the League of Nations would produce would be contrary to what is sought and contrary to the very principles of the League.

May I be permitted to call your attention to the fact that, with all our wishes to perfect it, the League as it exists to-day is far from perfection?

Japan decided at the Versailles Conference to join the League of Nations, believing that the United States of America, one of the prime movers, if not the prime mover, for the League of Nations, would join. As you all know, the United States of America, for their own reasons, refused to join. Let me be very frank and say that, the moment America decided not to join the League, every self-interest of Japan, narrowly construed, would have dictated that Japan should not join the League. America, that great Power across the Pacific Ocean, is out of the League; Soviet Russia is out of the League. At our door we have China, that vast country in these fearful conditions. I ask you to use a little imagination. How would you have acted if you had been Japan?

As we all know, the Japanese Government did not change its decision to be in the League. Why? Simply because it was anxious to contribute what little it could towards the League and thereby to contribute towards world peace. There could have been no other reason whatever. To-day, I have to confess, there are a number of serious thinkers in Japan, who, disgusted, exasperated that their case is not fully understood by the League of Nations, are urging withdrawal—that we made a mistake in entering at all. By what has been going on at Geneva you have produced these men in Japan, although I have to say, as I have said often before, that the majority of our people are still for the League. They are still for remaining loyal—just as loyal as they have been in the past.

Approach the same point from another angle. To-day, Japan is confronted with grave dangers. Conditions in China are worse than ever, despite the assurance of our Chinese Colleague to the contrary. In a word, Japan is to-day faced with an appalling situation throughout Eastern Asia, and is fighting single-handed to save the Far East—not to start war in the Far East; far from it. And we are confronting that situation with Soviet Russia still outside the League of Nations.

Now, having these cold facts before you, Gentlemen, would it not only be a bit of common sense to suggest to yourselves that Japan cannot be judged under the Covenant of the League without any elasticity or flexibility being allowed to it—as though the League of Nations included Soviet Russia, the United States of America and all other Powers among its Members, and as though the League of Nations were perfect to-day?

One speaker referred to nationalism and internationalism. He spoke as though some peoples in Europe were on a higher plane, while the Japanese were on a lower plane. I cannot quite see my way to agree to such a representation of Japan and other Powers. We Japanese, I think, can state, without fear of contradiction, that Japan has in the past contributed to international-



ism, if not throughout the world, at least in the Far East, and has contributed to world peace in an indirect way, if not in a direct way. We believe that a real internationalism can only be achieved through a healthy nationalism. We believe it, and, if that speaker meant to criticise Japan for holding such belief, I accept the criticism.

Again, several speakers have stated that the League is the life-line of their existence. This statement is, as I understand it, primarily made for the promotion of the self-interest of each individual Member. In Japan, we entertain a similar notion when we refer to Manchuria. That idea we base first on self-interest, and secondly on that great policy of Japan to which I have had occasion to refer—the maintenance of peace and order in Eastern Asia. Nevertheless, primarily we refer to Manchuria as our life-line from the standpoint of our own self-interest. I do not claim to know exactly the intentions of these speakers in referring to the “life-line”, but I do say that these gentlemen, when they speak of the League of Nations as their own life-line, admit that they are speaking primarily from self-interest, and I submit that it is only fair to allow us Japanese to present our case and make contentions based on the self-interests of Japan.

I will say a few words about Manchoukuo. As I have already had occasion to point out, the conditions in Manchoukuo are improving and the situation compares favourably with that of China Proper to-day. Its administration is working in a better way; its finances are assured; the most difficult question of currency offers no reason for anxiety. Our idea is that the healthy development of Manchoukuo will eventually contribute to the attainment of the high object for which the League stands.

Manchoukuo, when fully developed, will form the cornerstone of peace in the Far East—that is our faith. If, Gentlemen, you wish to know more about Manchoukuo, I can inform you that there are in Geneva three gentlemen connected with the Manchoukuo Government. One is General Tinge, personal represen-



tative of the Chief Executive of Manchoukuo; another is George Bronson Rea, Counsellor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who is regarded as one of the greatest authorities on Far-Eastern affairs; and the third is Mr. Arthur H. Edwardes, formerly Inspector-General of the Maritime Customs of China, who has accepted the position of Adviser to the Manchoukuo Government. This proposal was made to him by Manchoukuo to utilise his knowledge and experience gained in the Maritime Customs of China and later as the head of that great institution which was built up by Sir Robert Hart—perhaps the only institution worth mentioning in China.

May I now refer to the impression in some quarters that the actions of Japan in Shanghai and Manchuria were the actions of militarists? That is not true. That is a misrepresentation and, by the repetition of dogmatic statements which have no foundation, people were led to believe that misrepresentation. The moment our troops acted in Manchuria, the whole of the Japanese nation was roused and supported them. I belong to a political party in Japan, and we Japanese politicians fight among ourselves in much the same way as you. But, once this incident in Manchuria was known, we buried our differences. The people of all classes and of all shades of opinion buried their differences and supported the military officers who had acted as they should have acted. The same can be said about the military actions in Shanghai.

In this connection, will you allow me to suggest to you that if there were no good reason it would be inexplicable that the whole nation should stand by the actions of the officers? There was not one dissenting voice throughout the land. There are sixty-five million Japanese of pure blood, and they all stood up as one man. Do you suppose that they all went mad? Do you suppose that they were all insane? It is a pretty hard thing to make sixty-five million people insane, and I trust that our delegation here are not regarded by you yet as insane. Does

not common sense suggest to you that there must have been a very serious reason? Can you not at least suspect—unless you presume that we all went mad—that there must have been some good reason for the sixty-five million people to unite as one man in backing up these actions?

The reason is plain and simple. Our nation regards the issue connected with Manchuria as involving the very existence of Japan; she looks upon it as a question of life and death.

I owe it to candour to state—though it may shock some of you—that the irresponsible and misguided voices which were raised in the autumn of last year and the spring of this year in Geneva scared some of our people so much that they made up their minds to confront even the severest sanction under the Covenant—that is to say, economic boycott. They were ready to face it if need be, and I have to tell you, Gentlemen—and this does not imply any threat on our part, though our Chinese Colleagues conveniently refer to my utterances as threats because of a particular emphasis or a certain intonation which is really a habit of mine—that even to-day our nation is prepared to undergo it. And why? Because they believe that it is a question of now or never. They bow not before threats, they stoop not down even under sanctions. They will calmly face them because, rightly or wrongly, they believe that—now or never! And they do believe that they are right.

I need only point to half a century of Far-Eastern history to convince you that the aim of our Empire has been peace, in spite of all the accusations to the contrary advanced by our Colleagues from China. To mention but a few events: the wars with the United Kingdom and France were started in the eighteen-forties; the Tai Ping Rebellion, lasting fourteen long years, which was started in 1850; and the Sino-Japanese War in 1894-95, over Korea. The cause of this last war was the presumption on the part of China that she had suzerainty over Korea, which

forms a kind of dart directed at the very heart of Japan, as you can see for yourself if you have before you a map of the Far East.

China agreed, in the Treaty of Tientsin, that she would not contend for suzerainty over Korea. She violated that Treaty, and, instead of acting faithfully, she set about increasing her power in Korea. This brought about the Sino-Japanese War. Then the partition movement of China began to set in, and the Boxer uprising came. After that, the danger of partition increased more and more as time went by. China was more than once almost on the point of being partitioned. In this connection, I need hardly refer to the fact that, in the Boxer Rising, it was owing to Japan's participation in the allied expedition to Peking that the Powers were enabled to save their Ministers and their wives and children from being murdered. Suppose we had declined to join the troops of other nations and these Ministers and their families were murdered in Peking, do you imagine, knowing the temper of the world then and the realities that existed in the Far East, that there would have been any China to-day? A few years afterwards came the Russo-Japanese War. The greatest cause of this war was the secret alliance treaty concluded between China and Russia. We learned of it at the Washington Conference, to our great surprise. As we all know now, they very skillfully hid it from us and we didn't know that secret alliance treaty against Japan, under the terms of which Russia was offered every facility to make her way down to the southern extremity of Manchuria. Again, I am afraid, there would have been no Manchuria, perhaps no China, to-day, if Japan had not had the courage and strength to fight Russia.

We often hear of John Hay's note for the preservation of the integrity of China and so forth. We pay all our respects to that note of the Secretary of State of the American Government. However, taking into consideration the realities of the Far East, and the temper of the Powers since, would you imagine that the paper on which the note was written would have alone



enabled China to continue to exist? There must have been power behind the note. And whose power was it? Largely the power and strength of Japan. So we Japanese, to be very frank, feel that our Chinese friends ought to be thanking Japan as much as the United States of America for saving China from being partitioned, and for, later on, saving the Republic of China which these distinguished gentlemen from China now claim to represent.

Now let me refer to another point. For argument's sake, suppose Japan accepted the suggestions contained in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, such as the demilitarisation of Manchuria and the policing of that vast territory by setting up an international gendarmerie. To be very frank, the idea of creating a special gendarmerie for preserving peace and order in a country as big as Germany and France combined—outlawry and banditry rampant—appears to us an absurdity. You simply cannot do it. That scheme was once tried, I believe, in Turkey. Even there you could not succeed; in Manchuria never. Before we draw such conclusions, let me tell you what must be expected in the event of our accepting such suggestions. In the first place, you have to decide whose troops should be there. Suppose we agree to some plan of getting the sovereignty of China restored there. Naturally, I think my Chinese friends would contend that troops should be sent back to take control of the situation, for there must be some troops to restore order and maintain peace in Manchuria. Then what would happen? Are those troops to be the troops of General Chang Hsueh-liang or the troops of the Nationalist Government of Nanking? They have got to decide that in the first place. If I understand it correctly, the Report of the Commission makes it clear that the restoration of the *status quo ante* is impossible. Does that lead to the conclusion that General Chang Hsueh-liang should not go back to Manchuria? I do not know, but common sense will point to such a conclusion.



Now, let us suppose that General Chang Hsueh-liang does not send his troops back to Manchuria. Then it is left only to the Nationalist Government to send troops. Would it be permitted to do so? I am afraid they will have to settle that question between themselves before either of them can go into Manchuria, and that will at least entail hostilities and civil wars for the next two or three years.

What are you going to do in the meantime with Manchuria? Are you just going to take advice from Geneva that the people in Manchuria should keep quiet until these militarists settle that issue between themselves? And, when they settle that issue between them and send in some Chinese troops, I am inclined to think that that will produce another impasse and create a far worse situation than the one we are now facing. On that point, let me remind you that, in Chapter IX, the Report enumerates nine principles and then comes to the tenth principle. There it states that the conditions enumerated cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China. Now, when do you expect to have a strong Central Government in China? Not tomorrow. Certainly not. In a year? No. In two years? No.

I have made a life study of the Chinese problem and I believe I know something of it. I dare make the forecast that China will not be united and will not be able to have a strong Central Government (as an Oriental I feel sad for it) certainly for the next ten years, perhaps even for the next twenty years, and maybe not in our lifetime. That is the direction in which the actual conditions in China point. We must take these realities into consideration before we try to apply the fundamental principles of the League of Nations. We Japanese are not against these principles. No! But we call your attention to the realities of the situation. I am glad that many of my Colleagues agree with our contention on that point.

To put the matter briefly, the Japanese heart is adamant before threats and unwarranted criticism, but it is soft before

acts of kindness, appreciation and sympathy. Let me illustrate this by referring to our relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Only half a year ago, it would have been impossible to imagine any newspaper or anybody in Japan daring to advocate the signing of a non-aggression treaty between the two countries. What do we see to-day? Are we so unreasonable? Are we not amenable to reason and responsive to kindness? Before I left Tokio, I saw one of the greatest newspapers in Japan calling upon the people to give serious consideration to the question of a non-aggression pact, and only a few days after I arrived in Geneva the majority of our newspapers took up the question and expressed themselves in favour of it—a rapid and big change in public sentiment in Japan. What was the reason for this? The reply is very simple: Soviet Russia understood the Manchurian question. It understood our position and our actions there, and refrained from meddling with affairs in Manchuria. Not only that, but recently Soviet Russia has been doing all she could to save those Japanese in Manchuli and elsewhere along the frontier of Manchoukuo, who were held as hostages by a Chinese general who had been persuaded to rebel against Manchoukuo by Chang Hsueh-liang. This act of kindness appealed to the heart of Japan; hence this vast and rapid change in the national feeling towards Soviet Russia.

Half a year ago, it appeared that there was no hope whatever of inducing the Japanese nation to conclude a non-aggression pact with Russia, but I can now state from this tribune that there is very good hope of it.

Cannot the League of Nations take a profitable hint from this? As long as you hold out false hopes to the Chinese people that outsiders will come to their assistance, so long can we have no real peace in the Far East. This the Soviet Government understands, in addition to understanding the motives of Japan in connection with the Manchurian question.

With imperialistic Russia we might have had a war a long

time ago over Manchuria, which even this League would not have been able to prevent; but, thanks to Soviet Russia, we not only have no fear of that, but there is good prospect of coming to an understanding and peace. Is the League of Nations against or for that peace which is to be established between Soviet Russia and Japan in the Far East? It is for you to decide.

The League, as I have already had occasion to point out, has rendered a signal service to the cause of peace in connection with the Manchurian question. Another service it has rendered is that of preventing Powers from taking sides in this matter. That is the great service which the League has rendered for the cause of peace in the Far East. As you all know, the Powers were quarrelling in the Far East. Chinese statesmen are particularly adept in the art of causing Powers to find themselves at loggerheads. Since the League exists to-day, and because of its actions, the Powers have been prevented from taking sides. That is a great contribution.

Is it, however, too much for me to be so frank as to say that this very League which has prevented the Powers from taking sides—and has thus rendered great service to the cause of peace in the Far East—has given the appearance at least of taking sides with China against Japan? I do not believe for a moment that this was the intention of the League, but in some way such an appearance has been given. I do not know who is to be blamed, but at least the Chinese advertised in their own country, as well as abroad, that the League was backing up China against Japan. This encouraged China to continue in her attitude of refusing to start direct negotiations with Japan. I know personally that there are many Chinese in China who desire to enter into direct negotiations, but I will not divulge their names, lest they be attacked and killed by hare-brained students.

As you all know, the object of the League of Nations is peace. The object of the great Powers, such as America, the United Kingdom, France and others, is also peace. The object of Japan,



despite propaganda to the contrary, is peace. We do not differ in our object, but we differ with some as to the means. We are grappling with a grave question of life and death to our nation. We are also grappling with the great question of restoring peace and order in the Far East. Would not common sense suggest to you that the Japanese, with a history which has even been praised by some of my Colleagues, know something of the Far East, know what they are doing and know with whom they are dealing in the Far East?

Some people in Europe and America contend that world public opinion is against Japan, that Japan is defying world opinion, and so forth. Is that so? We are getting letters and even, in some cases, telegrams from different parts of Europe and America, appreciating our position and our contentions, and even encouraging us to persist in our present attitude. The number of these people is increasing. The situation is being better understood everywhere. But suppose that public opinion were so absolutely against Japan as some of the people try to make out, are you sure that the so-called world opinion will persist for ever and never change? Humanity crucified Jesus of Nazareth two thousand years ago. And to-day? Can any of you assure me that the so-called world opinion can make no mistake? We Japanese feel that we are now put on trial. Some of the people in Europe and America may wish even to crucify Japan in the twentieth century. Gentlemen, Japan stands ready to be crucified! But we do believe, and firmly believe, that, in a very few years, world opinion will be changed and that we also shall be understood by the world as Jesus of Nazareth was.

Finally, let me call attention to another point; I shall have finished in a few minutes. Let me again give you, in the fewest words possible, just a broad outline of the actual conditions in the Far East. Outer Mongolia fell off from China, as you know, many years ago; to-day it is virtually a part of Soviet Russia. I cannot find Tibet on the map of China to-day. Chinese Turke-



stan has hardly any connection with the so-called National Government at Nanking. And we find Sovietism right in the heart of China. The area over which the influence of that Sovietism extends is about six times as large as Japan Proper. I approach that problem with a question: will it stay there limited to the present area? Why has not that movement spread more rapidly? The answer is: there stands Japan. At least Soviet Russia respects Japan. Were Japan's position weakened, either by the League of Nations or by any other institutions or Powers, you may be sure that that Sovietism would reach the mouth of the Yangtse in no time.

Or suppose that Japan, getting disgusted, decides to keep away from China Proper and simply watch whatever development the conditions of China might take: in that case also I am sure that Sovietism would spread rapidly and would cover the greater part of China in no time. I feel sure of it, whatever our Chinese friends may say to the contrary. Not only that, but if we came to a definite agreement with Soviet Russia that we would keep aloof whatever might happen, what then?

If the object of the League of Nations is really world peace—and I believe it is—and peace in the Far East is part of it, which would you prefer? Would you prefer to weaken Japan, the only hope to-day in that appalling situation throughout Eastern Asia, thus bringing about more chaos in the Far East; or would you prefer to see Japan's position strengthened? That would give you a hope of re-establishing peace and order in the Far East. Gentlemen, I leave it to you to answer that question, and I thank you for your kind attention and patience in listening to me.

### III

## OBSERVATIONS OF THE JAPANESE DELEGATION ON THE DRAFT REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE ASSEMBLY BY THE COMMITTEE OF NINETEEN

February 21, 1933.

I. The Japanese Delegation deeply regret to find themselves unable to agree to the Draft Report submitted to the Assembly today by the Committee of Nineteen. There are a number of points in the Report which Japan cannot regard as statements of fact. Much of the Report is derived from the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. The Japanese Government have already made observations regarding this Report of the Commission of Enquiry. They feel, therefore, that there is no further use in labouring the argument with regard to the facts.

II. The present Sino-Japanese dispute is primarily due to the absence of authoritative and efficient central government in China. For the past twenty-one years, since the Monarchy was overthrown and the contest for power began among the military leaders, there has been no such government in China, and conditions have gone from bad to worse.

It was the condition of China, the anti-foreign and particularly anti-Japanese, activities of the Nationalist Party and Government, the persistent and repeated acts of provocation on the part of Chinese official and semi-official agitators in Manchuria (which is vital to Japan's security and existence) that brought about the state of affairs leading to the unfortunate incident of September 18, 1931. It was not the intention or desire of the Japanese Government to see Manchuria separated from

nominal Chinese sovereignty; and had the League been fully and well apprised of the facts, it probably would not have acted in haste in the early stages of the trouble, assuming an attitude of condemnation and rallying Western opinion against Japan precipitately and with unfortunate effect. To this attitude at least a measure of the blame is due for what has subsequently occurred.

III. Events which have transpired since the incident have given opportunity to leaders in Manchuria to establish the independence of the country. The military action which Japan took until September 15, 1932 (the date of the recognition of Manchoukuo) was an act of self-defence necessitated by conditions existing in China. The actions which Japan has taken since that date are based upon the Protocol signed by the two countries on that date. The undoing of this Treaty, as the Japanese Delegation have repeatedly stated, cannot be considered. This attitude on the part of Japan is based on the conviction that it is the only way to consolidate peace and security, not only in the region of Manchoukuo but throughout the whole Far East. Japan persists in her hope that, in the course of time, China will come to terms with Manchoukuo and Japan on this basis, which cannot fail to be also of benefit to China.

IV. Japan's policy in Manchoukuo is to assure the protection of her rights and interests, by assisting in the maintenance of order in that country and the preservation of its security against external aggression. This will, in turn, contribute to the maintenance of peace throughout the Far East. For Japan to accept the Draft Report would create uncertainties and probably disorders in Eastern Asia.

Japan implicitly believes in the sanctity of treaties, including the Covenant of the League, the Pact of Paris and the Nine Power Treaty. These treaties, however, only set forth general principles, and, in practical application, the realities of the situation



with which we have to deal must be duly taken into consideration. This should be the attitude of the League. In the case of the present Sino-Japanese dispute, Japan is convinced that, having regard to the exceptional conditions existing in China, a fundamental and conclusive solution of the dispute cannot be realised unless the principles of these treaties are applied in a way to harmonise with realities. Japan, in her endeavours to secure peace and welfare in the Far East, has had to reconcile these treaties with actions essential to the purpose.

V. Manchoukuo, since its establishment as an independent State, has gone forward steadily on the road of progress. Relieved of the blight of mis-government, the industrious and thrifty Manchu, Mongol and Chinese peoples have already begun to reap the benefits of their labours, where formerly they were robbed of much of them. Under the authority of civil government such as they never knew before, these people have already made progress in the domain of finance, railway administration, commerce and industry. Practically all of the hostile elements, largely composed of the remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's armies, have been suppressed. Only in the Province of Jehol does organised opposition continue.

VI. There are bandits and remnants of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops in Jehol, and recently, encouraged by the attitude the League has been displaying in the Sino-Japanese dispute, and having an eye to the progress of the situation in Geneva, the young Marshal has been concentrating his forces on and within the borders of the province. It must be noted in this connection that the bandits and troops directed by Chang Hsueh-liang have long been thrown out beyond the eastern border of Jehol, threatening the very heart of Manchoukuo. In this way China is making a demonstration before the League. The province of Jehol is a part of Manchoukuo. Japan is bound by a treaty with that country to assure its security and cannot remain inactive



in this situation. If Chang Hsueh-liang should withdraw his forces to within the Great Wall no military action would be necessary. The adoption of the Report by the Assembly will be likely to stiffen further the attitude of the Marshal in refusing to withdraw his forces, thereby aggravating a situation which Japan is anxious to avoid. (A communication on this subject, setting forth the details of the situation was sent to the League on February 20th.)

VII. (a) The Draft Report, while emphasizing the importance of the principles of the Covenant, does not offer an effective plan of solution for the dispute. The Draft proposes that a settlement be based on the principles laid down by the Commission of Enquiry. Yet the Commission stated that nine of the ten principles it proposed could not be fulfilled without a strong central government in China. There is no such government, and considering, in the light of Chinese history, the conditions actually prevailing in that country, there is no prospect in sight of such a government coming into being. Japan could not await indefinitely an eventuality so distant and uncertain.

(b) The Draft Report states that "the sovereignty over Manchuria belongs to China." This is not the Japanese view. It belongs to the people of Manchuria, now Manchoukuo. By historic right, by the particular character of the majority of the people, by the fact that China has never held or governed Manchuria except under Manchu Emperors, by reason of mis-government under the self-established rule of the Changs, the people have the right to independence. And who could more properly and rightfully be their ruler than the former Emperor of the Manchus?

(c) The Draft Report recommends the withdrawal of Japanese troops. It is true that Japan agreed to evacuation to the Railway Zone in the Council Resolutions of September 30 and December 10, 1931. But Japan agreed to this withdrawal on con-

dition that the protection of Japanese life and property would be assured. It must be remembered, in this connection, that Japan made a declaration on the occasion of the adoption of the Resolution of December 10, 1931, saying that her acceptance does not "preclude the Japanese forces from taking such action as may be rendered necessary to provide directly for the protection of the lives and property of Japanese subjects against the activities of bandits and lawless elements rampant in various parts of Manchuria. Such action is admittedly of an exceptional nature, called for by the special situation prevailing in Manchuria." It is presumed that the Draft Report contemplates that the security of the whole of Manchoukuo is to be maintained by a local gendarmerie force after the evacuation of Japanese troops. There is no precedent in the history of the world in which the security of such a vast territory was secured by gendarmerie. The proposition is absurd and cannot be put into practice. If the Japanese troops were withdrawn, the country would be quickly overrun by bandits and by Chang Hsueh-liang's troops, resulting in anarchy and disorder. Would the League be prepared to accept responsibility in such a situation, arising from the adoption of the Report?

(d) The Draft Report recommends the organisation of a committee to assist in the settlement of the dispute. It is proposed that this committee include representatives of Soviet Russia and the United States. On constitutional grounds Japan opposed the inclusion of representatives of non-member states on the proposed committee of conciliation. It is only logical that she should maintain the same attitude regarding the committee envisaged in the Draft Report.

(e) Finally the Draft Report asserts that the maintenance and recognition of the existing régime in Manchuria is no solution of the problem and proposes that the members of the League and also other states refrain from recognizing the present régime

either *de jure* or *de facto*. In so pronouncing judgment and proposing to influence, or even bind, if only morally, both member and non-member states in the matter of recognizing or not recognizing another state, the League would be acting *ultra vires*. In any case it would be embarking on an adventure which surely could not contribute to peace or to the happiness and welfare of the thirty million people of Manchoukuo, and it might prove to be an obstacle to the good understanding and friendly relations between nations, upon which peace depends.

VIII. As a whole, the Draft Report encourages the Chinese to reject overtures for peace and to evade a settlement. This is unfortunate. The consequences may be fraught with danger to the welfare of the peoples of the Far East. The adoption of the Report will, it is feared, bring about a result contrary to what the League is seeking to accomplish. It will tend to intensify the situation, jeopardise it, and possibly produce consequences of a serious character.

IX. Japan is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in the Far East. No other nation or group of nations would assume that responsibility. Japan intends to encourage and assist Manchoukuo in healthy and steady development. At the same time she intends to deal with China with the utmost good will and forbearance. Her object is lasting peace with the great neighbour beside whom she must continue indefinitely to live.

Japan is ready to cooperate with any friendly power or group of powers who understand her real intentions and are willing to go hand in hand with her in the great task of re-establishing peace and order in the region of Eastern Asia, now facing an unprecedented and an appalling situation.

X. In conclusion, the Japanese Delegation want to call the serious attention of the Members of the League to the gravity of the action that they propose to take. It is stated at the outset of the Report that "the issues involved in this conflict are not simple", that

“they are exceedingly complicated”, and that “only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as their historical background, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them.” The Japanese Delegation fully agree with this statement. They would ask the representatives of the Powers in the Assembly if they are sure that they have an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as the historical background, qualifying them conscientiously to vote upon this Report.

The Draft Report is based substantially on the Lytton Report. But it should be remembered that the Lytton Commission spent but six weeks in Manchuria and fifteen in China, the greater part of which was passed in Peiping. In these circumstances, we feel entitled to say that, while crediting the Lytton Report with many admirable qualities, it is not a document one can possibly look upon as containing all the facts of the case or upon which alone final judgment should be based.

The Japanese Delegation appeal to the Assembly to think twice before making their decision.



## IV

### ADDRESS DELIVERED BY YOSUKE MATSUOKA, CHIEF JAPANESE DELEGATE, AT THE SEVEN- TEENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE SPECIAL ASSEMBLY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

February 24, 1933

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—I do not feel called upon to reply to the discourse of my distinguished Chinese Colleague, for most of the points brought up by him were made very clear in the Observations of my Government and subsequent speeches of mine; some of them you will find replied to as I proceed with my speech.

The Japanese Delegation have notified the Assembly that they disagree with the Draft Report prepared by the Committee of Nineteen and cannot accept it. It is hardly necessary for me to say that the Japanese Government have given careful and serious consideration to this document and that it is with sad disappointment that they have come to this conclusion.

One outstanding feature that is noticeable throughout the Draft Report is the failure on the part of the Committee of Nineteen to realise the actual situation in the Far East, the difficulties of Japan's position in the midst of unparalleled and appalling circumstances, and the ultimate aim that is impelling Japan in her action.

For over twenty years China has been going through a revolution which has brought disaster to her people. Tens of millions of people have lost their lives as a result of internecine warfare, tyranny, banditry, famine and flood; hundreds of millions of them have been plunged into misery and despair. With armies

of communists ranging over a wider territory than the Nanking Government controls, a condition of chaos reigns throughout the country. Such distress and misery as exist among the Chinese people are beyond the imagination of the average man or woman living in Western countries. And the end of this catastrophe is not in sight. No one can foresee how long it will continue.

The fundamental cause of the trouble in the Far East is the lawless condition in China, the impossible reign of self-will in that country, without recognition on her part of her obligations to her neighbours. China has long been derelict in her international duties as a sovereign State and Japan as her nearest neighbour has been the greatest sufferer on that score.

Since the beginning of the revolution, which has shattered China into parts, all of what were called under the Manchu Dynasty the dependencies of the Empire have been lost to the Republic. Over none of these former dependencies has China any longer any control. Tibet is independent; Chinese Turkestan is completely cut off from contact with China Proper; Outer Mongolia became many years ago a part of the Soviet Union. Only Manchuria has remained, down to last year, a part of China—a part by a measure of contact and association, under the nominal sovereignty of that country. To say that Manchuria was under full sovereignty of China would be a distortion of the actual and historic facts. Now this territory has gone, it has become an independent State.

China is a vast country; but it is not a nation or country in the sense that Western peoples use the term. It is a country, larger than Europe, a region with as many governments in it as there are governments in Europe, a region with almost as many different groups of people, speaking almost as many mutually unintelligible dialects. That is one reason why China, in spite of her size, in spite of the enormous number of men in the various armies of the many dictators, is unable to defend itself to-day, unable to rid itself, as it desires, of the foreign military forces

stationed in and about its Treaty Ports, and the foreign naval vessels that ply the Yangtze River. These forces as I have said before, are not only Japanese. They are British, American, French, Italian and others. They guard the lives of the diplomats accredited to the Central Government, the so-called Central Government. Less than five years ago a portion of these forces, British and American, had to go into action at Nanking, the capital of the country, to save the lives of their official representatives assaulted by Government troops. For the moment, however,—this present moment—the hostility to other foreigners is abated, as you all must have noticed. It is being officially restrained with a definite object in view. We are not now hearing of China's determination to undo the "unequal treaties". Why not? Why has this agitation, vigorously and officially conducted prior to September, 1931, come abruptly to an end? Have you thought about that point? The answer is obvious. I need not make it.

China is a backward country, a country in an appalling condition of disintegration and distress. China is a problem, as the Lytton Commission has reported, to the peace of the world.

Beside China and beside another vast country,—I speak of Soviet Russia,—is Japan, a comparatively small country, very different from either of its colossal neighbours. The conditions of these neighbours in the past twenty years have given us Japanese deep and anxious concern. Our anxiety is not ended. We look into the gloom of the future and can see no certain gleam of light before us.

Inexorably situated beside China in chaos, Japan has had to bear and forbear, and for many years tried patiently to have her many grievances with the Chinese settled in an amicable manner. She followed that policy of conciliation even in the face of violent criticism from a portion of her own people. It has been Japan's hope and determination that Manchuria should become a land of law and order, of peace and abundance, a land that would be of benefit not only to Eastern Asia but to the world



at large. To achieve that end Japan was long prepared to co-operate with China, and she sought this cooperation, sought it for years. The Chinese, however, would not accept our proffered friendship and assistance. Instead, they offered constant obstructions and created continuous difficulties. In recent years—and especially since the deliberate development of anti-foreign sentiment by the Kuomintang and by the Nationalist Government—this opposition was intensified. The more we displayed patience, the more intense became the opposition until at last it reached a point that was intolerable. Instead of meeting us halfway, China took this attitude of ours as a sign of weakness. The Chinese began to claim that the Japanese should be driven out of Manchuria, that Japan should no longer share in the development of that land, condemning Japan as an aggressor pure and simple, as though there was no reason whatever for her to be in Manchuria, ignoring the whole historical background. This is not the first time that China has accused us of aggression. The impossible attitude and the violent movement based on such psychology on the part of the Chinese lay really at the bottom of the trouble, that finally resulted in what happened. Japan's policy of patience and conciliation failed. It failed because of China's, or rather Chang Hsueh-liang's, inability to appreciate Japan's intentions and friendliness.

It should not be necessary for me to dwell upon the importance that Japan attaches to Manchuria. The Assembly of the League should know by this time the economic and political necessities of Japan in that territory. But at this critical moment I want to remind you again that Japan fought two wars in Manchuria, in one of which she staked her existence as a nation on the outcome. She wants to fight no other.

It is true that international peace can be secured only upon the basis of mutual concessions. There are, however, with every nation, certain questions so vital to its existence that no concession or compromise is possible. The Manchurian problem is one

of them. It constitutes such a problem to the nation of Japan. It is regarded by our people as a question of life and death.

The Powers of the world have long been dealing in fictions regarding China. Long ago we should have noticed that the first Article of the Covenant requires that a State, Dominion or Colony, to be a member of the League shall be "fully self-governing". China is no such state. Beyond China Proper the sovereignty of China has long been gone, while within China Proper there has been no constituted government supreme and able to govern. The Nanking Government administers to-day the affairs of less than four out of the Eighteen Provinces.

The world cannot deal in such fictions as these and call upon the League to uphold the letter of treaties.

It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that Japan has been and will always be the mainstay of peace, order and progress in the Far East. If she has taken a definite stand regarding Manchuria in recent months, it is because she has been actuated by the implicit faith that that was the only course left to her after years of unrewarded forbearance and waiting. If she insists upon the maintenance of the independence of Manchoukuo, she is guided by the confident belief that in the present circumstances that independence offers the only guarantee of peace and order in the Far East.

Even after the present Sino-Japanese dispute began, Japan continued in her policy of conciliation. If China had been capable in those days of realising the actualities of the situation and had agreed to negotiations with Japan in a sincere desire to arrive at an agreement, one could have been accomplished without great difficulty. But China did not take that course. And what did she do? Instead, she appealed to the League of Nations. She sought to bind Japan's hands through the intervention of the Powers composing the League. And the League, not fully understanding the real issues involved or the actual conditions existing in the Far East, and perhaps not suspecting the real

motive for the Chinese move, gave her encouragement. Here lies the trouble.

It cannot be doubted that the League of Nations, in dealing with the Sino-Japanese dispute, endeavoured sincerely and conscientiously to bring about a satisfactory settlement at an early date. But, in point of fact, its actions have continually resulted in giving China a false hope and in encouraging her to take an attitude of defiance against Japan. In making her appeal to the League China was not, as you have been told, acting from love of peace and loyalty to principles. A country with more armed men than any other is not a nation of pacifists. A country which has habitually broken international pledges is not a nation that respects principles.

In proposing to the League to send a Commission of Enquiry to China, Japan was actuated by the belief that it was urgent and essential that the League should fully understand the realities of conditions existing there. But the result was disappointing to Japan. The Report of the Commission proved to be, in some respects, superficial in character. It displayed, in parts, a lack of penetration. It often failed to probe the problem to its depths. One of the reasons for this was undoubtedly the brief time in which the Commission had to make its investigations.

In this connection let me say a word regarding the population of Manchoukuo. A false impression has been given to the world by the Lytton Report on this subject. There were no authentic statistics upon which the Commission could base its view. No reliable Chinese census has ever been taken, even in China Proper, and any figures placed before the Commission by Chinese authorities could not be regarded as dependable. For many years the racial term "Chinese" has been applied, particularly by foreigners, including Japanese, to most of the people of the Chinese Empire. But this laxity in expression should not be taken to mean that Manchus and Mongols, or even the people of China Proper, are all of a single racial stock. The majority of the



people of Manchoukuo are distinctly different from those of China. Even the people of North China, from the Provinces of Shantung and Hopei, who have migrated to Manchuria to the extent of several millions in recent years, are strikingly different from those of other Chinese Provinces, different from those of the Yangtze Valley, more different from those of South China, radically different from those of Western China—different in physical appearance, different in many of their customs and in some cases even in their language. But even these immigrants who have gone from China to Manchuria in recent years do not form the bulk of the population. They form probably but a tenth, or at most but a fifth, of it. The great body of the population can properly be described as Manchurian. It is formed by the descendants of the old Manchu stock, by old Chinese stock which affiliated itself with the Manchus in former years, and by Mongols. The great majority of these people have never lived in China and have no such attachment to that country as the Lytton Report describes. Here the Report was clearly in error.

Regarding the Report of the Committee of Nineteen, I am constrained to make a critical remark. I do not want to accuse that Committee of prejudice, but I cannot refrain from making the observation that, while China is exonerated, nothing whatever is said of the work of my country and people in their long and difficult efforts to preserve peace, to promote law and order, to benefit the people of Manchuria.

The good work of my country in Manchuria is on record. It is not on record, however, in the Draft Report, but you can see it in Manchuria. The physical developments that we have made there are visible monuments of our efforts and our ability. The well-ordered cities of the Leased Territory, the thriving condition of the Railway Zone, the improvement of Chinese cities influenced by our initiative, the vast mining and industrial enterprises, the schools, the hospitals, the technical bureaus,—these things, the like of which exists nowhere under Chinese adminis-

tration, are testimony to our service to the people of the land. In short, we have been and are a great civilizing and stabilizing force in that wild country. If the Committee of Nineteen knew and understood what we have done to benefit the people of Manchuria they might have gone out of their way to say just a word in favour of this great work of ours. If they did not know and understand why the people of China Proper migrate to Manchuria, it might have been well for them to enquire. Yet they have felt that their knowledge was sufficient to qualify them in proposing to the Assembly that it adopt the momentous proposal contained in this Draft Report. Do you really think it is right? Do you think it is common-sense?

On the first page of the Report are these lines. I quote them :

“The issues involved in this conflict are not as simple as they are often represented to be. They are, on the contrary, exceedingly complicated. And *only an intimate knowledge of all the facts, as well as of their historical background*, should entitle anyone to express a definite opinion upon them.”

This passage was, as you know, taken from the Lytton Report, and the Commission was right in having this passage in its Report. Beginning with this statement, the Committee of Nineteen proceeded to pass judgment in this dispute, judgment against a nation which is the bulwark of whatever law, order, and peace there exist in the Far East, and in favour of one whose backward condition has been the cause of wars in the Far East for nearly a century. I suppose I may take it that the members of this Assembly who are now about to vote on the Draft Report have all read histories of China written by impartial authors. But I am not too sure of that, for there seems to have been a lack of careful reading even of the Lytton Report.

Let us now turn to the recommendations made by the Commission of Enquiry. Their full significance seems to have been overlooked in the Draft Report before us. I refer in particular

to the tenth and final Principle contained in Chapter IX. That Principle reads as follows:

“Since the present political instability in China is an obstacle to friendship with Japan and an anxiety to the rest of the world (as the maintenance of peace in the Far East is a matter of international concern), and since the conditions enumerated above cannot be fulfilled without a strong Central Government in China, the final requisite for a satisfactory solution is temporary international co-operation in the internal reconstruction of China, as suggested by the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen.”

I would ask the League to consider carefully this definite warning. I would ask that it be not misled by the thought or the hope that China can be changed by the mere sending of technical commissions to aid the harrassed government with advice regarding sanitation, education, railway, financial and other administration. More than that is needed, much more—so much that no great Power or group of them would be willing to undertake the task. Some form of international control may be helpful, but who is going to undertake it? Of this I am speaking earnestly, and I am speaking with knowledge of China—the real China, the China that exists in fact and not in theory or imagination, the China that has made many wars already, and now seeks to make another, the China that does not fight her own battles, but calls on distant friends to fight her nearby neighbour.

In the above connection, permit me to put one categorical question to my Chinese Colleagues. Although my Colleague Dr. Yen expressed—on behalf of the Government that exists at Nanking, but which does not rule the whole of China—his willingness to accept the recommendations without any reservation, I would put this categorical question to him and his Colleagues to answer: Are the Chinese Government really prepared to accept these recommendations which envisage in the final analysis the imposi-



tion on China of an international control in one form or another? You cannot get away from that, however, you may try to cover it up with words. Will you make the position of your Government clear on this point before the Assembly votes on this Draft Report?

I have no doubt that the attitude of the League in the present dispute has always been conceived with a genuine desire to uphold the sanctity of treaties and the principles of peace and serve the cause of peace, but its efforts have had the result of adding confusion to the situation. The Jehol affair, which is giving all of us concern at this moment, is a case in point. It is a demonstration on China's part, made for the purpose of affecting the League's decisions. There would have been no onrush of Chang Hsueh-liang's troops beyond the Great Wall except for instigation from the Nanking Government which, in turn, has been encouraged by the attitude the League of Nations has been taking vis-à-vis Japan. The Japanese Government are not in the least anxious about the outcome of a conflict with these Chinese contingents. They are not the troops of a modern army, well trained, well disciplined, well organised, well officered. They are not troops inspired with zeal for a cause or love of country. They are mercenary troops, with loyalty only to their military chief, and, like other Chinese armies, loyal because their chief provides for them the means of living. The moment some other chief tempts these soldiers with money or means of living they will desert their present chief. But Japan is loath to see further unnecessary bloodshed, and, for that reason, has been and is endeavouring to persuade Marshal Chang to withdraw his forces. The prospects, however, do not seem at this moment very encouraging.

I refer to the situation in Jehol to bring home to you the possible effect the adoption of the Report now before us may have upon the situation in the Far East. Please think seriously on this point. The adoption of this Report would give the im-

pression to the Chinese that they had been exonerated from all responsibility, that they could continue to defy Japan with impunity. It would serve further to embitter the feelings of the Japanese and Chinese peoples, whose interests are closely interwoven. The two peoples ought to be friends and should co-operate with each other for their common welfare.

By the adoption of the Report before you, however, the Assembly would not be helping us, either Japanese or Chinese, along the road to that goal, nor would it serve the cause of peace or the interests of the suffering masses in China. There are two Chinas: the China of war lords, politicians, and of those gentlemen who have been educated abroad and represent an imaginary China at an Assembly like this, and the China of four hundred fifty million souls suffering under the yoke of these war lords and politicians, who care nothing about their welfare. By the adoption of this Report, would you be serving the cause of these suffering masses in China?

The Report of the Committee of Nineteen not only accepts the Report of the Commission of Enquiry but goes even further: it passes judgment on the basis of premises which are incongruous and far removed from actualities.

Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria was only nominal at most, but the Draft Report before us would undertake to establish Chinese sovereignty over Manchuria in a more or less effective manner; that is to say, it undertakes to introduce into Manchuria the power and influence that China has never had before. Let us pause and think; does it stand to reason? It would, moreover, open the way for Chinese agitators and give rise to more complications only to end, I am afraid, in another and possibly worse catastrophe.

Again, the Draft Report makes an attempt to establish a measure of international control over Manchuria, where there has been and is no such control. A moment ago I was referring to the international control of China, but now I am referring to

the setting up of international control of Manchuria. What justification is there for such an attempt on the part of the League of Nations? I cannot see. Would the American people agree to such control over the Panama Canal Zone? Would the British people permit it over Egypt? In any case, how would you do it? Which of your Governments would undertake it, assuming a grave and heavy responsibility certain to entail sacrifices—sacrifices, I am sure, of great magnitude?

In this connection, let me state clearly once and for all that the Japanese people will, for reasons too patent for me to feel it necessary to explain, oppose any such attempt in Manchuria. You can be sure of that. We do not mean to defy the world at all; it is only our right. This must be plain to anyone who would take pains to read the history of the Far East.

A verdict is given in the Draft Report that the Chinese boycott against Japanese goods imposed after the outbreak of the present dispute falls within the purview of retaliatory measures. My distinguished Chinese Colleague referred in particular to this, and you, Gentlemen, will in time know what is meant. If the adoption by the Powers of any forcible measures, made necessary by the exigencies of the situation, for the protection of their rights and interests and for the protection of the rights and property of their nationals in China, is on each occasion to be met lawfully by a retaliatory boycott, a very dangerous principle will have been established, and established by the League of Nations. The seeds of incalculable future trouble for each and every Power interested in China will have been sown.

You should think twice before you adopt a report which includes such a principle as this.

If you are interested in the problem of peace in the Far East, and I believe you are, you will find, as I had occasion to point out previously, that the real question, the greatest question before us to-day is the anarchy in China. But you have not proposed to do anything in that connection. The Manchurian question is



only one phase or rather one result of it. In the eagerness to deal with the Manchurian question, you are forgetting the big question that lies at the root of all the troubles in the Far East—the anarchy in China. What are you going to do about it?

In the actual circumstances in which Japan finds herself as above described, and for the reasons above stated at some length, there is no alternative for her to take in regard to the Draft Report before us. The Committee of Nineteen has left her none. She had promptly and unequivocally to answer “No”.

Our desire is to help China as far as lies within our power. We are sincere. This is a duty that we must assume whether we like it or not. Paradoxical as this statement may sound to you at this moment, it is true; and our present effort to assist Manchoukuo to her feet, over which we are unfortunately having differences, will lead some day, I am confident, to the realisation of Japan's desire and duty to help China and thereby at last to succeed in firmly establishing peace throughout the region of Eastern Asia.

Gentlemen, will you give Japan a chance to realise this aim or will you not?

I beg this body to realise the facts and see a vision of the future. I earnestly beg you to deal with us on our terms and give us your confidence. Our history during the past sixty years is, I think, a guarantee of our good faith; is that history of no worth beside China's history, the history of creating disturbances and bringing about catastrophies in the Far East? To deny us this appeal will be a mistake. I ask you not to adopt this Report,—for the sake of peace in the Far East and for the sake of peace throughout the world.

## V

# DECLARATION OF THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE VOTE OF THE ASSEMBLY ON THE REPORT SUBMITTED BY THE COMMITTEE OF NINETEEN

February 24, 1933

Mr. President and Gentlemen:—On behalf of my Government I wish to make a declaration.

It is a source of profound regret and disappointment to the Japanese Delegation and to the Japanese Government that the Draft Report has now been adopted by this Assembly.

Japan has been a member of the League of Nations since its inception. Our delegates to the Versailles Conference of 1919 took part in the drafting of the Covenant. We have been proud to be a Member, associated with the leading nations of the world, in one of the grandest purposes in which humanity could unite. It has always been our sincere wish and pleasure to co-operate with the fellow-members of the League in attaining the great aim held in common and long cherished by humanity. I deeply deplore the situation we are now confronting, for I do not doubt that the same aim, the desire to see a lasting peace established, is animating all of us in our deliberations and our actions.

It is a matter of common knowledge that Japan's policy is fundamentally inspired by a genuine desire to guarantee peace in the Far East and to contribute to the maintenance of peace throughout the world. Japan, however, finds it impossible to accept the Report adopted by the Assembly, and in particular, she has taken pains to point out that the Recommendations contained therein could not be considered such as would secure peace in that part of the world.

The Japanese Government now finds themselves compelled to conclude that Japan and the other Members of the League entertain different views on the manner to achieve peace in the Far East and the Japanese Government are obliged to feel that they

have now reached the limit of their endeavours to co-operate with the League of Nations in regard to the Sino-Japanese differences.

The Japanese Government will, however, make their utmost efforts for the establishment of peace in the Far East and for the maintenance and strengthening of good and cordial relations with other Powers. I need hardly add that the Japanese Government persist in their desire to contribute to human welfare and will continue their policy of co-operating in all sincerity in the work dedicated to world peace, in so far as such co-operation is possible in the circumstances created by the unfortunate adoption of the Report.

On behalf of the Japanese delegation, before leaving the room, let me tender their sincerest appreciation of the labours ungrudgingly given to find a solution of the Sino-Japanese dispute, before you for the past seventeen months, by the President and Members of the Council, as well as by the President and Members of the General Assembly.

*(Following this address the Japanese Delegation withdrew)*

## VI

### FAREWELL MESSAGE GIVEN OUT BY YOSUKE MATSUOKA ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FROM GENEVA

February 25, 1933

About to leave Geneva I cannot repress my deep emotion; I can hardly find words to express my thoughts. I left Tokyo with the determination to take any amount of pains to explain Japan's case and enable the people of Europe to understand our difficulties and our position. I was determined to prevent a clash between the League and Japan, to make it possible for Japan to stay in the League and to continue her cooperation in the interest of world peace. When I arrived in Geneva I dared permit myself to entertain some hope.

Three months afterwards, I am leaving Geneva with that



hope shattered, with mixed feelings of sadness and resignation. I am sad not for Japan but for the League for taking such precipitate action. Time will show that it hurts the League more than Japan. I am sad most for China, for such action by the League not only will not solve anything but will add another element of confusion in the conditions of China, already bad enough as they are. It will only lay one more obstacle in the way of Japan's arduous fight against chaos.

The only good I can think can come out of all this will be incidentally to help further to unite the Japanese people, making them better realise the magnitude and the difficulties of Japan's task, and increase their determination to risk all to achieve their end—that is to recover and maintain peace and order throughout the region of Eastern Asia. If the League's action were only to produce that effect, Japan may even find cause, after all, to thank the League. In any case let us hope this action of the League will not widen the gap that separates East from West; however, none but God knows what the future holds in store for us all.

I hardly need to say there is no place in my soul for resentment or misgiving. I am sad it is true, but not disappointed; I am still hoping that some day Japan will be understood. I am leaving Geneva with the prayer that the Members of the League may be enabled to see the light and with ardent wishes for the success of the League. One consolation I have was the abstention of the Siamese Representative from voting yesterday. He represents the only Asiatic nation, besides Japan and Manchoukuo, which has a real national integrity and responsibility, with the will and ability to govern.

On leaving Geneva I wish again heartily to thank the Members of the League for the labour so ungrudgingly given for the past seventeen months in their earnest attempt to find a solution for the most complicated problem that the League has faced in the thirteen years of its existence. I wish also to express my thanks for the many courtesies shown me and the Japanese Delegation by the city of Geneva and the Genevese.



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